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The plight of the poor has played a role in America’s politics for decades. In the
1930’s, Franklin Roosevelt’s Democratic Party vowed to fight the Great Depression, and
by implementing countless anti-poverty initiatives and agencies it won enormous favor
with the public and ushered in a period of Democratic dominance. In modern politics,
narratives surrounding the poor and programs designed to help them are utilized by
Republicans and Democrats to further their party’s agenda. I examine the influence of
various demographic factors on the attitudes of Mississippi residents towards spending by
the government intended to alleviate poverty, using the Mississippi Poll’s results from the
years 2004-2014 as my dataset and using cross-tabulation analyses to draw conclusions.
I find that gender and religiosity are relatively weak predictors of poverty spending
attitudes, while income, education, and age are stronger predictors, and race and party
identification are very strong predictors.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

“But I conceive the first duty of government is to protect the economic welfare of
all the people in all sections and in all groups.”—Franklin D. Roosevelt, April 14, 1938
Introduction
This paper studies public opinion on the issue of government poverty spending in
the twenty-first century. While this paper begins its research in 2004, the government did
not begin spending money on the poor in 2004, and the poor have been a part of society
long before the government began to spend large sums of money on them. Therefore, it
is useful to consider first a history of poverty, government poverty spending, and the
public’s attitude toward that spending in the United States.
October 24, 1929 was a day that profoundly changed the course of not only the
U.S. economy, but also the trajectory of its politics. Herbert Hoover defeated his
opponent in the election of 1928, winning nearly 60% of the vote and carrying the whole
country save only the South, Rhode Island and Massachusetts. While this surely seemed
a great victory at the moment, the Republican Party may not have celebrated had they
known it would put them in power when the Great Depression hit. The election of 1932
was almost a perfect reversal of the 1928 election, and led to more than a decade of
dominance by the Democrats. In 1933, approximately 1 in 4 Americans were out of
1

work (Department of Labor). The plight of the poor was no longer a matter of charity, an
issue that concerned only a relative few; almost literally overnight, it became a problem
that confronted the majority of Americans in their daily lives. Even if they did not lose
their own jobs, most citizens had close friends or family who did. The election of 1932
made the public’s reaction clear. Government could not stand by and watch people
suffer; it needed to step in and find a solution to help those who were struggling. The
interplay between poverty and politics had changed permanently.
Once voted into power that was exactly what Franklin Roosevelt’s Democrats set
out to do. The president’s New Deal introduced countless relief programs providing
government-sponsored work and wages; one particularly important program, the Works
Progress Administration (WPA), is estimated to have provided more than 8 million jobs
over the course of the Depression (Arnesen 2007). While the New Deal programs
enjoyed great popular support, there were already voices who questioned the
effectiveness of government-subsidized “busy work” and the quality of the laborers that it
employed (Ginzberg 1943). The actual effectiveness of work-assistance programs in
“solving” poverty is beyond the scope of this paper; rather, it is the perception that they
are beneficial to society (or the perception that they are not) among the public that is of
primary concern to this paper. In the same vein, it is not the truth of the various
normative arguments made for or against poverty assistance that is most relevant here;
what matters is simply the question of how well they are able to convince and sway the
populace. This early criticism of the New Deal policies, while fairly impotent at the time,
foreshadowed the conversations that were to come.
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While the Great Depression is long gone, its legacy remains in the American
political arena and likely will for the foreseeable future (if not permanently). After more
than a half-century, the question of whether government should seek to actively help the
poor remains relevant and hotly debated. As with most issues, the issue divides sharply
along party lines. Republicans often feel that hard work is the American way, the only
true path out of poverty—that a man down on his luck must pull himself up by his
bootstraps. A Democratic narrative might emphasize the potential benefits of investment
in human capital, arguing that if the poor have their basic needs met they will be more
able to hold work and eventually better their situation. These conflicting viewpoints have
played out on the national stage many times since the Great Depression, from Lyndon
Johnson’s Great Society to the debate over welfare reform in the 1990s; even in the most
recent presidential election year, warning calls about progress towards a “welfare
society” continue to be fielded by the right side of the political playing field (Blake
2012). With the coming of the Great Recession in 2008, welfare politics may be more
relevant to the public discourse in the past decade than they have been since the 1930s.
How does the electorate engage with the issue and with the narratives and policies
put forth by the two parties? Do only the poor support government assistance policies?
Or are there elements of more affluent citizens among the electorate who believe that the
government should help the less fortunate? Do voters believe that poverty assistance
programs come at the expense of the taxpaying middle class, or do they believe that
poverty assistance programs ultimately bolster the middle class by helping people rise up
to join its ranks? While such detailed inquiries fall outside the scope of this paper, they
all branch off from the same essential question. How does the public feel about poverty
3

assistance by the government—specifically, are they for it, or are they against it?
Knowing this allows more detailed questions to be pursued and useful inferences to be
drawn.
Trends in Voter Behavior
Voters’ decision-making encompasses a great deal more than only their feelings
about the poor and the government’s role in helping the less fortunate. In the same vein,
while both major parties have taken decisive stances on the issue at one time or another,
it is only one of many issues which define their overall platforms. According to the
“Michigan model” established in one of the first major studies of voter behavior, partisan
identification is overwhelmingly the single most important factor in determining how a
voter will cast his or her ballot. This party identification can be formed definitively by
key life experiences or exposure to sufficiently convincing information, but more often
than not it is merely “inherited” from the voter’s parents, effectively setting the voter’s
beliefs in stone before they become active in the electorate (Campbell et al, 1960). While
certainly a powerful indicator of voting preferences, party identification does not exclude
the possibility of a voter’s being influenced by his or her feelings on particular issues.
Since identification with a certain party implies agreement with its policies and platform,
it may be the case that a voter chooses to identify with a certain party based on a key
issue (such as immigration in the case of a migrant to the U.S.—or poverty assistance in
the case of the poor), as opposed to identifying with a party first and then later adopting
its specific views on policy. If it is the case that party identification is the key factor in
determining voter behavior, then the question of voter behavior becomes one of how to
4

predict party identification—one tool for doing so may be to look at a voter’s beliefs on
specific issues (Converse 1964).
An important factor to consider when examining the electorate’s views on more
specific issues is the narrative presented in the media and how this narrative affects
potential voters. It is here that it is useful to begin sub-dividing voters into different
groups according to their personal attributes. Scholars have held that some people are
naturally more receptive to new political information while other may be hesitant to
accept it, and that in a similar vein people are also more or less invested in following
political news and researching political topics (Zaller 1992). The people who most
vigorously indulge in and follow politics become the political “elites” of the population,
those who are both most aware of what is happening in the nation’s political discourse
and the most knowledgeable about the issues being discussed. While certainly average
citizens can and do fall under this category, an example of such an “elite” might be
Rachel Maddow or Rush Limbaugh, people who are deeply engaged in political
discourse on a day-to-day basis. These individuals are considered to be ideologues or
“opinion leaders,” stubbornly principled to the point that their views are more or less
fixed and stand no reasonable chance of being swayed by conflicting information.
This trait makes them all the more useful as examples of elites, as scholars hold
that political elites also generally have this disposition. Since they have invested so much
time and energy—not just physically, but often also emotionally—into learning about
political issues, the opinions they form and stances they take around these issues are
unlikely to budge once they coalesce. If exposed to a countervailing narrative from the
other side of the aisle, a political elite is more likely to dismiss it in favor of maintaining
5

the belief system that they adhere to. It is not hard to imagine that this might occur
because elites are both much more likely to have encountered common counterarguments to their viewpoint before (therefore entering any exchange with an already
much-jaded view of the opposition) and much more likely to have a serviceable response
ready when challenged. Ultimately, though, the reasons why this occurs are not as
important as the mere fact that it does (Campbell et al, 1960).
This is important to bear in mind because it relates to the relative lack of
stubbornness as one goes lower on the electorate ladder. While the elites on the highest
rungs might form their political views and then hold them close to their heart for all
eternity, they are a minority among the population. Most voters are neither so
knowledgeable nor, perhaps more important, so hesitant to change their view. Voters
closer to the colloquial “Joe Sixpack” do not follow news and politics so closely and thus
are less likely to encounter new information; however, likely in part because they
encounter new information infrequently, they are also more likely to be swayed by it
(Zaller 1992). These less engaged voters, who comprise a much larger share of the
population, may not feel a strong sense of loyalty to one party or the other and may
instead make their decisions at the ballot-box (and indeed, the decision of whether to
even bother going to the ballot-box) based on more heavily discussed “hot-button” topics
as opposed to a rigid, pre-determined ideology. This concept can be seen in action in the
aftermath of Great Depression; after all, if the population were all as stubborn as the
elites, the massive shift in favor from the Republican Party over to the Democrats would
never have occurred. The economic woes brought on by the Depression were no doubt a
“hot-button” issue in the lives of Americans which held enough weight to get them to
6

change their voting behavior, whether that meant changing their vote from Republican to
Democrat, or actually getting up and going to the polls to vote the Democrats in rather
than simply staying home and listening to the radio. Accordingly, while party
identification remains a strong indicator of voting preferences, scholars have found that it
is not immutable and can change over time (Green, Palmquist & Schickler 2002).
The Role of Media
The primary avenue by which political information and “hot-button” issues reach
the public, both political elites and otherwise, is through the news media: cable TV news
stations, radio news programs, newspapers, and so forth and so on. Newer forms of
Internet media such as Facebook, Twitter and various online news websites such as the
Huffington Post are gaining prominence as sources of information for younger voters.
Regardless of the specific medium used, all of them have one important trait in common:
They cannot relay facts and information with perfect and unbiased clarity. Even if they
attempt to do so, human error makes it impossible to achieve, and indeed many news
outlets in the modern day barely even bother with a façade of objectivity. Stations and
commentators such as Fox News and Rush Limbaugh deliver news and discourse with a
decidedly conservative bent, consistently criticizing the actions and policies of
Democrats while praising those of Republicans; equivalent news sources also exist on the
liberal side of the spectrum (Graber 2010). No matter what source of news a voter
interacts with, the information is conveyed through that particular source’s lens, altering
the way it is perceived by the voter through the choice of words used to describe the
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events in question, the omission of certain facts or the emphasis of others, and additional
factors.
This is noteworthy since it means that the media have a role to play in shaping
voter opinions and ultimately their behavior. While some scholars believe that the news
media is largely irrelevant and has only a minimal effect on voters, others have found that
it can make a measureable difference. This is shown through the concept of “information
flows,” certain narratives or sets of facts which are emphasized by the news media to
create an image with voters (Zaller 1992). Fox News and other staunchly conservative
outlets would be described as providing a “conservative flow” of information and vice
versa. Oftentimes, there are conflicting streams of information in the news media, in
which case the overall effect of the news media becomes difficult to measure at best.
However, at times the media may become more united in its narrative and present a fairly
consistent image of a certain issue, in which case it begins to have a noticeable effect on
voters because there is only one dominant “information flow” on the issue at hand.
The media’s narrative regarding the Vietnam War could be considered one
example of this phenomenon, as the majority of media outlets began to uniformly portray
the war in a negative light and so pushed public opinion (and in turn, public policy)
towards ending the war. A more recent case can be observed in the case of the 2002
invasion of Iraq. By emphasizing a certain narrative above the alternatives—in this case,
the idea that the dictator Saddam Hussein had access to weapons of mass destruction and
was aiding terrorist organizations—and downplaying contradicting information, the
media presented a consistent message to the public in favor of the invasion and public
support for the war was consequently very high when it first began. The loss of support
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for the Iraq war witnessed in the years to follow could be considered a regression to the
mean, a return to the “normal” state of affairs in which there are conflicting streams of
information presented in the media which keep the public divided along more
traditionally partisan lines.
The media’s role in influencing the public is noteworthy because it demonstrates
the malleability of voters when it comes to specific issues that are particularly relevant at
a certain point in time. While many voters may have fairly well established party
preferences which they rarely stray from, enough voters can be swayed to make a
difference on specific issues. This can be seen most recently in the case of same-sex
marriage, an issue that has made almost a complete turnaround in the span of just a
decade or two. Less than twenty years after the passage of the Defense of Marriage Act,
officially declaring marriage to be defined as between a man and a woman at the federal
level, the country now considers same-sex marriage legal in over half of its states and
may soon see it made legal in all of them. This sharp switch in policy has been
accompanied by a sharp switch in public opinion on the matter; while a majority of
Americans opposed legalizing same-sex marriage twenty years ago, today the majority
agree that it should be made legal (Newport 2011). Clearly, enough independents and
weak partisans on the Republican side were swayed to make a large difference in the
nation’s overall sentiment on the issue. Therefore, merit remains in studying the opinions
of voters on specific controversial topics as opposed to focusing on party identification.
Voters may feel differently from the party they are loyal to on specific issues, they may
not identify strongly with one party or the other while still holding strong opinions on
specific issues, and perhaps most importantly, discourse on specific issues may lead to
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change in the general stance of voters even among those staunchly loyal to one party or
another. After all, at one time it was politically viable for members of the Democratic
Party to argue against racial integration in society, whereas in the current day to support
such a practice would be political suicide even for a Southern politician.
The topic of welfare policy is certainly not excluded from these influences. In the
case of welfare, literature suggests that public opinion has shifted against povertyassistance programs over a long period of time. Beginning in the 1960s, politicians
increasingly described welfare recipients (and the public increasingly began to perceive
them), women particularly, as “lazy, promiscuous, and inept.” The image formed of a
single mother who had multiple children out of wedlock, lived comfortably on a
government check, and was not even looking for a job. The animosity towards this
perceived abuse of welfare programs grew over the following decades, culminating with
the abolishment of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program in
1996—legislation that was signed by a Democratic president, no less, an indication of
how strong political will on the issue had become (Lens 2002). In the past fifteen years,
this trend may be reversing to some degree; 2012 presidential candidate Mitt Romney
provoked an intense backlash from both media and the public when he made harsh
comments about the “forty-seven percent of the country who pay no income taxes.”
Despite the fact that the stereotypical “welfare queens” would clearly be included in that
demographic, Romney stated that the remarks “did real damage to my campaign,”
helping his opponent’s campaign to portray him as “an out-of-touch rich guy” (Davidson
2012, Cillizza 2013). Time will tell whether or not there has been another significant
shift in public opinion on the poverty issue, however, as these events are still quite recent.
10

Voter Preferences and Poverty Spending
Given the literature regarding general voter behavior and opinion formation, how
does the specific issue of poverty assistance interact with this knowledge? It is useful to
begin by furthering the distinctions discussed above between “political elites” and the
larger, less-active portion of the electorate. In addition to classifying citizens as elites
with regards to their political knowledge in general, scholars have further identified that
certain citizens can be considered “issue voters,” voters who may not be as vigorously
invested in the whole spectrum of politics as the “elite” voter described above, but who
are nonetheless heavily invested in and highly knowledgeable regarding specific issues
which are of importance to them (Carmines & Stimson 1980). “Issue voters” may thus
be seen as a step between an ideological “elite” and the less active and uninformed “Joe
Sixpack,” as they are found to be more educated and politically motivated than most
other voters. Continuing with the Great Depression as a useful example of these
dynamics, the Democratic power shift that took place could be seen as an event that
motivated a large number of “issue voters” on the subject of the economy’s abysmal
state.
Issue voters can be further divided into “easy” and “hard” issue voters. “Hardissue” voters are defined as voters who form their opinions through some degree of
conscious calculation, who engage in some amount of critical thinking in order to come
to their conclusions. Once the conclusions are formed, the voter then attempts to identify
and vote for the candidate whose policy preferences most closely match his own. “Easyissue” voters, meanwhile, are defined as voters on an issue that has become “so ingrained
over time that it structures voters’ ‘gut responses’ to candidates and political parties”
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(Carmines & Stimson 1980, p. 78). Since a “gut response” does not require active
consideration on the part of the voter—he or she votes in a certain way because he or she
knows that those around her have overwhelmingly expressed that preference for as long
as he or she can remember, without necessarily understanding why—this type of issue
voter is considered to expend less effort in making his or her decision. The distinction
between these two types of issue voters is important because scholars have found that
there is little difference between easy-issue voters and the rest of the voting public, save
perhaps that they act on a gut response to a single issue as opposed to gut feelings about a
political party as a whole. Hard-issue voters however are those who, as described above,
tend to be measurably more educated about and more invested in political issues,
especially the particular issue that they take interest in. This follows logically from the
fact that hard-issue voters are characterized as those who attempt to think critically about
the issues they are voting on.
Addressing the question of the poverty issue specifically, the Michigan model
provides evidence that economic status is one predictor of voting behavior in its
treatment of social class. While there can be short-term fluctuations which are difficult to
predict and account for, in general it finds that individuals perceived as higher class tend
to vote conservatively while those of a lower status favor the Democratic party more. For
example, with the large swing towards poverty and the accompanying shifts in public
sentiment, the Great Depression could be seen as a particularly large and long-lasting
fluctuation. This model can also be seen in action in the voting history of the southern
states; traditionally the poorest in the nation, they could be counted on to vote
Democratic in presidential elections for decades before transitioning over to solid
12

Republican control in more recent elections. Whether this is a temporary fluctuation or a
permanent paradigm shift remains to be seen, however. In addition to this effect on party
identification and consistent with the idea that people may vote in their own economic
self-interest, it is found that people are more likely to support poverty assistance from the
government specifically if they are living in an area with a higher unemployment rate. In
this case, the specific anti-poverty measure put forth was “governmental guarantees of
full employment,” but it is not hard to imagine that people expressing support for such a
measure would also endorse other traditional “welfare” programs such as SNAP and
TANF (Campbell 1960). Also relevant is the durability of these preferences; even as
many as seven years later, in counties where unemployment had been high people still
showed an increased support for governmental guarantees of employment. This is
consistent with the findings of scholars that voter preferences, while malleable to a
degree, are slow to change and long lasting once fully formed (Green, Palmquist &
Schickler 2002).
In addition to the self-interest component of a voter’s opinions on social welfare,
research has also found that there is a strong abstract ideology component in how voters
approach these issues. A 1992 study on the subject found that over half of respondents
appealed to abstract concepts such as “individualism, humanitarianism or limited
government” when discussing their views on government-sponsored poverty assistance.
Thus there is evidence that voter opinions on the issue are influenced by a mix of both
concrete life experiences and the effect of abstract ideological arguments. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, voter sentiments invoking individualism and limited government were
found to be exceedingly prominent, such that one-third of respondents classified as
13

“social liberals” still made some mention of “taxes & budget” in their answers despite
being in favor of poverty assistance programs (Feldman & Zaller 1992). This preference
among voters might be traced all the way back to the founding principles of the nation;
after all, one of the foremost goals in the design of the U.S. Constitution was to limit the
powers of government. Additionally, the image of a strong, hard-working American
earning his fortune by the sweat of his brow is deeply entrenched in the American
political psyche and its influence is not easily pushed aside. This classic American image
may be one of the roots of the common sentiment that a man must “pull himself up by his
bootstraps” rather than relying on outside help from the government to make ends meet.
The prevalence of such ideas implies that a position favorable towards social
welfare programs is ultimately the more difficult to sustain and justify among voters.
Indeed, the study posits that social liberals experience more “conflict” when discussing
welfare policy due to the need to “reconcile” their policy preferences with the traditional
American ideals outlined above (Feldman & Zaller 1992). This is unsurprising given the
emphasis of the Republican Party on limited government and fiscal responsibility;
obviously Republicans feel that their conservative narratives on these issues will play
well with voters, and that is borne out by the evidence. The high instance of appeals to
abstract ideologies when interviewing respondents also suggest that the poverty issue
may be a “hard” issue which accordingly attracts “hard-issue” voters, those who are more
invested and more knowledgeable than the electorate at large. Clearly, if the question of
poverty assistance elicited mere “gut reactions” from voters, one would expect a much
more conspicuous absence of such well-formed ideological responses. This is important
to note as it suggests that voters thinking more about the poverty-assistance issue may be
14

accordingly more educated and have more well-formed thoughts regarding political
ideologies on the whole.
Given that economic class and personal economic experiences help predict a
voter’s choice of party, and that these experiences remain relevant to the voter for years
at a time, it is clear that the question of government poverty assistance can have a
profound effect on voter behavior. While the available literature tells us much about the
history of public opinion regarding welfare programs and spending for the poor, there is
not so much research regarding contemporary opinions on the issue. As I touched on
above, there is reason to believe that public opinion may be shifting once again in favor
of government poverty-assistance programs compared to previous decades. The largest
such shift in history occurred as a result of the Great Depression; considering that the
largest economic crisis since that time has occurred within the past ten years, it is
reasonable to suspect that a similar change may have taken place. Given that my data
measures responses on the poverty issue in the past ten years only, with over half of those
years being 2008 (the beginning of the financial crisis) and onward, I hope to contribute
to the knowledge base regarding contemporary opinions on poverty spending.
Additionally, much of what we know about public opinion is measured at a national
level; an aggregation of the country’s population as a whole. Since my data is drawn
from Mississippi specifically, I hope to highlight any regional differences that may exist
between the state and the nation at large.

15

CHAPTER II
HYPOTHESES

“If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who
are rich.”—John F. Kennedy, Jan. 20, 1961
Hypothesis 1 – Gender Variable
Women are more likely than men to believe that the government should spend the
same amount or more on poverty assistance programs.
In my first hypothesis I predict that women will prove to be more favorable
towards poverty spending than men. I base this prediction on the propensity of women to
vote Democratic more often than men, a trend that has been found to exist at nearly all
age ranges (Newport 2009). If women identify with and vote as Democrats, it follows
that they will more likely agree with Democratic policy positions which tend to
encourage either spending more money on poverty-assistance programs than is currently
spent, or at the least not cutting funding to such programs. On the other hand, women
may not necessarily identify with the Democratic Party because of the poverty issue. It is
possible that they vote Democratic due to their stances on other issues—abortion rights
and other topics considered to be “women’s issues.” For instance, the National
Federation of Democratic Women prominently displays a link labeled “Save the Violence
Against Women Act” on its homepage (National Federation of Democratic Women). If
16

women who vote Democratic are issue voters more so than strong overall partisans, they
may therefore be more ambivalent on the poverty issue than one would expect based
purely on the party they choose to vote for.
Literature has found that the “gender gap,” as this propensity of women to vote
more Democratic may be termed, is not actually a propensity of women to vote for
Democratic so much as a propensity for men to vote more Republican. It has been found
that the gender gap is in fact a result of the changing political attitudes of men over time,
who have shifted more to the right than women have. More interesting, this literature
also finds that the gender gap may have formed primarily due to differences in attitudes
towards welfare spending specifically between men and women. This finding is of
particular interest to this paper as it suggests that not only are women more likely to
support poverty spending, as this paper predicts, but that this gap in attitude between the
sexes is so strong that in fact men are more likely to vote Republican solely on the basis
of poverty spending attitudes (Kaufman & Petrocik 1999). Earlier literature also supports
the idea that welfare spending is a primary driver of the “gender gap” in voting patterns
and issue attitudes between men and women, finding that this effect was clearly observed
during Ronald Reagan’s presidency (Gilens 1988).
Hypothesis 2 – Race Variable
Blacks are more likely than whites to believe that the government should spend
the same amount or more on poverty assistance programs.
Hypothesis 2 states that African-American voters are more likely to support
poverty spending than Caucasians. This is likely to be true as a result of the
17

overwhelming degree to which African-Americans identify as and vote for Democrats in
the current political environment. While African-Americans have not always identified
strongly with the Democratic Party, it is undeniable that they do so now and have for
some time. For instance, both John Kerry and Barack Obama, the two most recent
Democratic Presidential nominees, took over eighty-five percent of the African-American
vote (Abramowitz, 2011). In 2006’s midterm elections, over seventy percent of nonwhite voters voted for the Democratic candidate in House races (CNN Exit Polls 2006).
Given the previous findings regarding voting behavior of African-Americans in
presidential elections, the percentage among African-Americans specifically (as opposed
to non-whites generally) may be well above that. This is not a contemporary
phenomenon, either. While African-Americans were solidly Republican voters over a
century ago, showing a strong preference for the “party of Lincoln,” as long ago as 1936
a large shift in African-Americans towards the Democratic Party can be observed (Daniel
2012). This initial shift during the Great Depression was a result of the perception that
Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal programs had improved their economic fortunes, and
later in the twentieth century this preference for the Democratic Party among AfricanAmericans would be strengthened even further by the actions of President John F.
Kennedy during the Civil Rights Movement.
With such a huge margin of partisan identification it seems quite plain which way
Hypothesis 2 will go. However, even if the hypothesis is not likely to bring new
knowledge to the table in the sense of whether the relationship is in the direction
predicted or not, it may still be useful to measure the magnitude of said relationship. For
instance, if sixty percent of African-Americans express a desire for more poverty
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spending as opposed to say, eighty to ninety percent, this represents a substantial gap in
aggregate policy preferences for the group despite both cases being predicted by
Hypothesis 2. Analysis of the race variable can also provide information about whether
African-Americans’ feelings on the poverty issue specifically are as strong as their
identification with the Democratic Party in general, and whether or not the population of
African-Americans local to Mississippi differs in any meaningful way from the national
population.
Hypothesis 3 – Age Variable
Younger people are more likely than older people to believe that the government
should spend the same amount or more on poverty assistance programs.
In Hypothesis 3 I predict that young people are more likely to support poverty
spending. I base this hypothesis on the increased identification of older voters as
conservatives and subsequently Republicans, along with the large number of younger
voters attracted by the Democratic Party in recent elections, particularly 2008. In 2008 it
was estimated that voters under thirty provided millions of votes to Barack Obama and
contributed substantially to his victory (Abramowitz 2011). Of course, the votes of
young people in 2008 will not necessarily be representative of their feelings on the
poverty issue today, but it does provide the foundation for my hypothesis. In conjunction
with the above, older voters are measurably more likely to vote Republican (CNN Exit
Polls 2006).
This is an easily observed trend throughout Mississippi’s history. A primary
driver of changing political attitudes over time is generational replacement. Among
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white Mississippians, younger generations of voters are consistently more tolerant and
socially liberal than their older counterparts. Research has found that in the 1980s eighty
percent of white Mississippians under age 30 supported school integration while this
figure was under fifty percent for those over sixty (Krane & Shaffer 1992). While a
preference for the rights of racial minorities does not necessarily also indicate an
increased tolerance for government welfare spending, both political attitudes are divided
sharply among party lines, with Republicans typically being less tolerant in both of these
areas and Democrats generally being more tolerant. As a result it is logical to expect that
older voters would also be more likely to oppose increases in government poverty
spending, or even prefer that it be cut back from current levels.
Hypothesis 4 – Religiosity Variable
Those who identify as less religious are more likely to believe that the government
should spend the same amount or more on poverty assistance programs compared to
those who identify as more religious.
My fourth hypothesis states that those who are less religious are more likely to
support poverty spending than those who are more religious. In this case, religiosity is
measured by frequency of church attendance. Highly religious groups tend to support
conservative viewpoints, so I predict that those who are not particularly religious by
comparison will be more sympathetic to the liberal viewpoint on this issue. Since 1980,
the highly religious among America’s Christian communities have shifted towards the
Republican Party; many political commentators of the time felt that the “evangelical
right” played an important role in the election of Ronald Reagan (Johnson & Tamney
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1982). Research suggests that the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade may have
had a hand in causing this shift, as people typically classified as “highly religious”
(defined as attending church weekly or near weekly) have been found to mostly oppose
the legality of abortion while those who only attend church monthly or less are mostly
unopposed (Pew Research Center). Therefore, despite their increased identification with
the Republican Party, it is not necessarily the case that highly religious people will
oppose poverty spending to the same degree as Republican politicians; it is possible that
the highly religious are issue voters who are more invested in social issues such as
abortion and same-sex marriage. Nonetheless, I predict that they will be more opposed to
poverty spending as well.
Hypothesis 5 – Education Variable
Those with a higher level of educational attainment are more likely to believe that
the government should spend the same amount or more on poverty assistance programs
compared to those with a lower level of educational attainment.
Hypothesis 5 predicts a greater degree of support for poverty spending among
more educated voters. I base this hypothesis on an increased propensity for highly
educated individuals to identify as liberal. Professors and other academic staff at
universities overwhelmingly self-identify as liberal (Rothman, Lichter & Nevitte 2005).
An immediate flaw in this line of reasoning is the fact that not all those with college
degrees or more go on to work in academia, however, polling has also shown that in 2012
Obama led over Romney among voters holding a college degree while the reverse was
true among the non-college educated (Marist College Institute 2012). Still, a preference
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for the presidential candidate of one party does not indicate absolute support of the
party’s broad platform. It must be considered that higher levels of education are also
correlated with higher levels of income, which are in turn associated with more
conservative political leanings and a preference for the Republican Party (Erikson &
Tedin 2007). This apparent contradiction provides evidence for the possibility that many
highly-educated voters may disagree with the Democratic platform on certain issues even
if they express support for the party in presidential elections.
Hypothesis 6 – Income Variable
Those with a low income are more likely to believe that the government should
spend the same amount or more on poverty assistance programs compared to those with
a higher income.
Hypothesis 6 is fairly straightforward. It predicts that poorer and less financially
secure individuals will vote in their own economic self-interest. Low income individuals
are logically more inclined to be enrolled in government assistance programs, and once
enrolled in such programs they have a very concrete incentive to wish that the programs
stay around. The literature on the subject supports this simple line of reasoning regarding
the voting preferences of individuals based on income. It has been found that when
measuring the effects of social “stratification” on political attitudes, a higher income
leads an individual to possess a more conservative attitude towards economic issues
(Knoke 1979). This is not surprising as higher income individuals are both less likely to
benefit from government programs currently, and also have less reason to believe that
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they will have need of them in the future due to their increased personal wealth compared
to others.
However, as explained above under Hypothesis 5, there is a potential conflict
between this hypothesis and Hypothesis 5; there is evidence that highly educated
individuals are more likely to support the Democratic Party, and there is also evidence
that low income individuals are more likely to vote Democratic (Brooker & Schaefer
2006). The problem is that education and income are positively correlated (U.S. Census
Bureau 2004). If a higher income individual is less likely to vote Democratic than a
lower income one, one would expect that more highly educated individuals are less likely
to vote Democratic as a result. However, this is not necessarily the case. This leaves a
conundrum to be played out in the data below, which give an answer to how these
conflicting influences play out in Mississippi with regards to poverty spending attitudes.
Hypothesis 7 – Party Identification Variable
Those who identify as more Democratic are more likely to believe that the
government should spend the same amount or more on poverty assistance programs
compared to those who identify as more Republican.
Of all seven, Hypothesis 7 is the simplest and the one which needs the least
explanation or elaboration. The Republican Party tends to oppose government-sponsored
welfare and insist that any benefits provided be tied to work (Republican Party Platform).
As a result, any individuals identifying as Republican but expressing support for more
government poverty spending face a direct contradiction in their expressed political
views. While it is certainly not impossible for someone to identify as a Republican in
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general while not supporting the party’s stance on government welfare specifically, there
is obvious reason to believe that such a case will be the exception rather than the rule. As
with Hypothesis 2, despite the direction of the relationship being nearly a foregone
conclusion, it remains useful to measure the magnitude of the relationship. If Democrats
are fairly united in wanting more poverty spending while Republicans are not united in
cutting it (or vice versa), this still provides useful information about the overall trend of
political attitudes amongst the public.
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CHAPTER III
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

“Even with the tax relief we’ve put in place, a family with two kids that earns the
minimum wage still lives below the poverty line. That’s wrong.”—Barack Obama, Feb.
12, 2013
Dataset
In order to test my hypotheses regarding attitudes toward poverty spending in
Mississippi, I rely on data from the Mississippi Poll conducted by Mississippi State
University’s Social Science Research Center. The Mississippi Poll has been conducted
on a biennial basis since 1981; in each poll, approximately 600 adults are contacted and
asked a series of questions about political issues. This makes the Mississippi Poll the
oldest and most comprehensive source of public opinion data for the state of Mississippi.
I have chosen for my analysis the years 2004 through 2014, the most recent poll, in order
to best represent contemporary political attitudes in the state. The total number of
respondents for the six polls conducted during this decade combined is 3018.
Respondents may refuse to answer a question or choose to respond with “don’t know”;
these responses were not considered valid and were excluded from the analysis, and as a
result, the total N size for each variable differs from one to the next and is likely to be
slightly less than 3018 as well.
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A total of eight variables from the Mississippi Poll are used in conducting the
analysis. For each variable, the corresponding question was asked in all six years of the
poll under consideration, so the total sample size is consistent across all variables. The
relevant variables and information regarding how they were coded are described below.
Coding information for race and gender is not provided on the basis that it is self-evident.
Dependent Variable
“Now I'm going to ask you about some issues facing state and local government
in Mississippi. As you know, most of the money government spends comes from the
taxes you and others pay. For each of the following, please tell me whether you think
state and local government in Mississippi should be spending more, less, or about the
same as now. How about programs for the poor?”
The respondent’s answer to this question is used as the dependent variable. Three
answer choices were given: Less, Same and More.
Independent Variables
Seven independent variables were measured in the analysis: Gender, race, age,
religiosity, education, income, and party identification. Some variables had more than
five response categories and as such were recoded into five groups in order to facilitate
the use of multivariate tables, as well as for the sake of reducing the size of the resulting
tables. The age variable was recoded into five categories consisting of: 18-29, 30-41,
42-53, 54-65, 66+. Religiosity is measured as frequency of church attendance, divided
into five categories: Weekly, Near Weekly, Monthly or More, Yearly or More, and
Never. Educational attainment was measured in the following five categories: Some
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High School (no high school diploma), High School Graduate (high school diploma or
GED), Some College (attended college but did not complete a degree), College Graduate
(completed an undergraduate degree), and Post-Graduate Work (including all respondents
who had entered graduate programs). The family income variable had seven categories
organized in intervals of $10,000 measuring per-year earnings; beginning with “<
$10,000,” proceeding to “$10,000 - $20,000”, and so forth until the highest category of
“> $70,000.” The middle six response categories in the family income variable were
collapsed into three intermediate categories measured in intervals of $20,000 instead of
$10,000. The party identification variable and its sub-questions resulted in the following
seven response categories: Strong Democrat, Weak Democrat, Independent Democrat,
Pure Independent, Independent Republican, Weak Republican, and Strong Republican.
For both parties, the “weak” and “independent” response categories were combined into a
single “weak” category to reduce the original seven categories to five.
Methodology
With the data arranged as outlined above, I used IBM SPSS Statistics software to
produce cross-tabulations of the dependent variable and the relevant independent variable
for each of my seven hypotheses. I rely on the t-value of the chi-square association test
to determine both the existence of a relationship between the two variables and the
relative strength of said relationship; observation of the cell percent values reveals the
direction of the relationship in the event that one exists, as well as providing a useful
secondary measure of association. All cells in all cross-tabulations have expected counts
well above five, ensuring that the chi-square test of association is valid. I also include
27

Goodman and Kruskal’s gamma as another measure of association; while the chi-square
test of association is the primary indicator of a relationship between the variables, the
gamma value can supplement this test by providing a separate value for analysis when
two independent variables both produce extremely small (less than .001) t-test values. It
also provides another way to measure the direction of a statistical relationship between
two variables.
In the following analysis, by far the most powerful and reliable variable is the
race variable. As will be shown in the data relating to the relevant hypothesis, nearly
eighty-five percent of black respondents believed that the state government should spend
“more” on poverty-assistance programs. While this does not entirely invalidate the
results of the cross-tabulations formed from the other dependent variables, it does mean
that it is useful to also run cross-tabulations for the other six hypotheses which control for
the race variable. Without controlling for this variable, the results in all other crosstabulations will be skewed heavily towards the “More” answer. Cross-tabulations
excluding black respondents have therefore been included in the analysis for the six
hypotheses not relating to race. While cross-tabulations excluding white respondents
could be used to determine the effect of other demographic factors within the black
population in Mississippi, the fact remains that the white population displays a
substantially greater degree of variety in its responses and is therefore more receptive to
the influence of the non-racial demographic factors. A follow-up comparing whether
factors such as age, income, etc., affect the responses of the black respondents in the
same way that they affect the white respondents may be an avenue for future research.
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Results
Hypothesis 1 states that women will have a more favorable disposition towards
poverty-spending programs than men. Oddly, there is support for the hypothesis in the
data, but only in the cross-tabulation where black respondents were included along with
white ones. As shown in Table 1, a higher percentage of women than men chose both the
“More” and “Same” responses while a higher percentage of men chose the “Less”
response. However, in the cross-tabulation controlling for the race variable in Table 2, a
higher percentage of women responded with “More” but a higher percentage of men
responded with “Same,” producing an inconsistent result. This inconsistency is reflected
in the measures of association; in Table 1 the chi-square statistic, while still relatively
high, is measurably lower than that of Table 2, which is sufficiently large to conclude that
there is no appreciable relationship between the two variables whatsoever.
Unfortunately, given that the test statistic is still over .05 for Table 1, the odds that the
results are not significant are unacceptably high. The gamma values are also quite low,
sitting below 0.1. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 must be rejected in favor of the null
hypothesis.
Table 1 Gender and Poverty Spending Preferences
Poverty Spending
Preference
Less
Same
More
Gamma
X2

Gender
Men
14.6%
29.1%
56.4%
.092
< .05

Women
12.9%
25.5%
61.6%
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N Size
(396)
(785)
(1709)

Table 2 Gender and Poverty Spending Preferences-White Respondents
Poverty Spending
Preference
Less
Same
More
Gamma
X2

Gender
Men
20.9%
35.7%
43.4%
.054
> .1

Women
19.0%
34.4%
46.6%

N Size
(357)
(627)
(806)

Hypothesis 2 states that blacks are more likely than whites to believe that the
government should spend the same amount or more on poverty assistance programs. The
results as shown in Table 3 are not surprising and need little explanation. The voting
preferences of the African-American community are well-known and their preferences
toward government poverty spending fall in line accordingly. As already mentioned
above, the race variable is easily the most significant single demographic factor observed
here. No other independent variable produces such a high gamma value. Indeed no other
variable comes even close save only party identification. In short, the findings are
consistent with what we already know about African-American political behavior, and
the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of Hypothesis 2.
Table 3 Race and Poverty Spending Preferences
Poverty Spending
Preference
Less
Same
More
Gamma
X2

Race
White
19.9%
35.0%
45.1%
.711
< .001

Black
2.7%
13.5%
83.8%
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N Size
(383)
(759)
(1626)

Younger people are more likely than older people to believe that the government
should spend the same amount or more on poverty assistance programs. That is the basis
of Hypothesis 3. In Table 4 the cell percentages do not show a consistent pattern for the
first two responses, “Less” and “Same.” However, a very consistent pattern emerges in
the percentages for “More,” starting with a majority of respondents answering with
“More” in the first age range but less than fifty percent by the time the table reaches the
oldest age group, a decline of twenty percentage points. This provides evidence in favor
of my hypothesis that younger people will be more amenable to poverty-spending, which
is further supported by a chi-square significance value below .001. Interestingly, the
effect of age on the dependent variable becomes less clear when African-American
respondents are excluded from the cross-tabulation. In Table 5 none of the age groups
display a consistent pattern; even in the “More” category, cell percentages go up between
the first two age groups but down between age ranges two and three. Comparing the
overall response patterns of each age range to the others reveals no obvious pattern,
either, as the second and third age ranges gave answers that were slightly more favorable
to poverty spending than the youngest age range, but the youngest range still displayed
more support for poverty spending than the oldest age group. This is accompanied by a
low gamma value of -0.76, suggesting that the relationship between age and povertyspending preferences among white respondents is weak in the event that such a
relationship exists. Oddly, the chi-square significance value for Table 4 is also below
.001, indicating that some relationship between the two variables likely exists. However,
the exact nature of the relationship is left quite unclear by the data. In spite of this
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ambiguity when controlling for the race variable, the cross-tabulation for the general
population provides sufficient evidence to accept Hypothesis 3.
Table 4 Age and Poverty Spending Preferences
Poverty
Spending
Preference
Less
Same
More
Gamma
X2

Age
Range
18-29
12.1%
23.0%
64.9%
-.170
< .001

30-41

42-53

54-65

>65

N Size

11.9%
18.7%
69.4%

14.3%
27.0%
58.7%

15.4%
30.5%
54.1%

14.6%
40.7%
44.7%

(387)
(779)
(1685)

Table 5 Age and Poverty Spending Preferences-White Respondents
Poverty
Spending
Preference
Less
Same
More
Gamma
X2

Age
Range
18-29
21.7%
29.9%
48.4%
-.076
< .001

30-41

42-53

54-65

>65

N Size

20.7%
28.1%
51.2%

16.9%
33.7%
49.4%

21.8%
37.1%
41.0%

17.6%
46.0%
36.4%

(349)
(625)
(802)

Hypothesis 4 poses that those who identify as less religious are more likely to
believe that the government should spend the same amount or more on poverty assistance
programs compared to those who identify as more religious. In Table 6, no obvious trend
emerges in any of the 3 response categories. In each category, all five of the
corresponding cell percentages are within ten percentage points of each other, indicating
a relative lack of variation as the table moves from higher church attendance to lower.
Additionally, “flip-flopping” is seen for all three response categories, with the cell
percentages neither going up nor going down consistently from the left side of the table
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to the right. Despite the chi-square significance value indicating the existence of a
relationship between the two variables, the gamma value is less than .1 suggesting that
whatever relationship exists is not very strong. Similar results appear in Table 7. Aside
from an obvious general shift towards the “Less” and “Same” responses as a result of
excluding African-American respondents, there is not a clear and obvious pattern. Table
7 does, however, have more variance between its cell percentages than Table 6; not all
cell percentages fall within ten percent of each other in each row, as was the case in Table
6. This is accompanied by a slightly higher gamma value, supporting the notion that the
relationship between the two variables is stronger in Table 7 than it is in Table 6.
Table 6 Church Attendance and Poverty Spending Preferences
Poverty
Church
Spending Attendance
Weekly
Preference
Less
13.5%
Same
29.6%
More
56.9%
.048
Gamma
< .001
X2

Near
Weekly
15.8%
29.9%
54.3%

Monthly
or More
9.0%
26.9%
64.1%

Yearly or
More
15.4%
23.4%
61.2%

Never

N Size

17.1%
21.3%
61.6%

(391)
(783)
(1687)

Table 7 Church Attendance and Poverty Spending Preferences-White Respondents
Poverty
Church
Spending Attendance
Weekly
Preference
Less
19.5%
Same
39.2%
More
41.3%
.085
Gamma
2
< .001
X

Near
Weekly
22.7%
39.2%
38.0%

Monthly
or More
15.1%
36.6%
48.3%
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Yearly or
More
21.7%
28.6%
49.7%

Never

N Size

20.7%
22.6%
56.7%

(355)
(626)
(800)

Further evidence for a clear relationship is seen in the “More” response row.
While the percentage decreases from the “Weekly” to the “Near Weekly” category, it
then increases substantially over the following three categories. Given that the “Weekly”
and “Near Weekly” categories are arguably the most similar out of the five churchattendance categories, their difference measured in days rather than months or years, one
could argue this as clear indication that those who rarely attend church are more likely to
answer with “More” than those who frequently attend. As with Table 6, the chi-square
significance value indicates the existence of some relationship between the variables, so
the evidence in Table 7 provides support for Hypothesis 4 overall. The data provides
mixed evidence, but the hypothesis is most clearly supported for white respondents.
Hypothesis 5 states that those with a higher level of education are more likely to
believe that the government should spend the same amount or more on poverty assistance
programs compared to those with a lower level of education. Table 8 displays a strong
relationship compared to many of the tables examined above. The cell percentage for
“Same” increases while the percentages for “More” decrease in all five cells as one
moves from less-educated to more-educated, indicating a shift away from preference for
“More” government spending as level of education increases. In addition, the cell
percentage for “Less” increases as one moves from left to right in all but one case;
moving from “College Graduate” to “Post-Graduate Work,” it actually decreases.
However, it decreases by less than a full percentage point, and the combined percentage
of respondents falling under both the “Less” and “Same” responses is still higher for
“Post-Graduate Work” than it is for “College Graduate.” Hence, overall the trend
remains very apparent. The gamma value is consistent with these findings, reaching
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nearly .3. In Table 9 nearly the exact same pattern can be seen. The cell percentages in
the “Same” row no longer increase with absolute consistency from left to right, instead
decreasing in one case (“Some College”  “College Graduate). However, other than this
the exact same pattern from Table 8 is observed in the cell percentages. Furthermore, the
total decrease in the percentage of respondents for the “More” category is even more
pronounced in Table 9. While the percentage of “More” respondents decreased by thirty
percentage points moving from “Some High School” to “Post-Graduate Work” in Table
8, in Table 9 it decreases by approximately thirty-eight percentage points. In Table 9,
less than half as many respondents with “Post-Graduate Work” provided the “More”
answer compared to respondents with “Some High School.”
Table 8 Education and Poverty Spending Preferences
Poverty
Educational
Spending Attainment
Preference Some High
School
Less
7.0%
Same
19.2%
More
73.8%
-.273
Gamma
2
< .001
X

High
School
Grad
13.3%
23.8%
62.9%

Some
College

College
Grad

15.5%
32.3%
52.1%

20.1%
34.9%
45.0%

PostGrad
Work
19.2%
37.0%
43.8%

N Size
(394)
(784)
(1698)

Table 9 Education and Poverty Spending Preferences-White Respondents
Poverty
Educational
Spending Attainment
Preference Some High
School
Less
10.2%
Same
20.1%
More
69.7%
-.266
Gamma
< .001
X2

High
School
Grad
20.6%
33.0%
46.4%

Some
College

College
Grad

21.7%
42.2%
36.0%

25.3%
39.6%
35.1%
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PostGrad
Work
23.9%
44.0%
32.1%

N Size
(357)
(627)
(807)

This indicates a strong trend in the same vein as the one observed in Table 8;
indeed, the gamma values for the two tables are nearly identical. These results are
fascinating because they suggest that even when controlling for the variable of race, the
effect of educational attainment on poverty-spending attitudes remains consistent. Does
this mean that higher educational attainment leads to a less favorable view towards
government poverty spending among African-American respondents at the same rate as it
does among Caucasian respondents? This is one question that could be addressed in
future research. Among the general population, however, the results presented above are
rather clear. Hypothesis 5 is rejected, as the exact opposite of the hypothesis was found
in the data.
The basis of Hypothesis 6 is that those with a low income are more likely to
believe that the government should spend the same amount or more on poverty assistance
programs compared to those with a higher income. Tables 10 and 11 also display a clear
trend of decreasing support for state poverty spending as one moves from less to more
affluent, left to right on the tables. This is to be expected given the known correlation
between level of education and income and given the results already observed in Tables 8
and 9. Many of the higher-income respondents answering with “Less” or “Same” in
these tables are likely the same people answering with “Less” or “Same” in the highereducation categories of the previous two tables. Of note is the fact that income may be an
even stronger predictor of poverty-spending attitudes than education, however. In both
Tables 10 and 11, the most affluent group (those making more than $70,000 per year in
family income) provided a lower percentage of “More” responses than the most highlyeducated group in Tables 8 and 9 (“Post-Grad Work”). However, this does not hold true
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across all corresponding response categories; for example, there were also more “Less”
responses in the least affluent category than they were in the least educated response
category. The primary evidence in favor of a stronger relationship between income and
poverty-spending attitudes than education is the gamma values, which are higher for both
Tables 10 and 11 than they were for Tables 8 and 9.
Table 10 Family Income and Poverty Spending Preferences
Poverty
Spending
Preference
Less
Same
More
Gamma
X2

Family
Income
< $10,000
9.9%
15.3%
74.8%
-.352
< .001

$10,000$30,000
8.7%
22.6%
68.7%

$30,000$50,000
13.2%
23.6%
63.2%

$50,000$70,000
16.8%
36.2%
47.0%

> $70,000

N Size

25.4%
39.9%
34.6%

(326)
(616)
(1323)

Table 11 Family Income and Poverty Spending Preferences-White Respondents
Poverty
Spending
Preference
Less
Same
More
Gamma
X2

Family
Income
< $10,000
17.9%
16.3%
65.9%
-.287
< .001

$10,000$30,000
13.8%
29.1%
57.1%

$30,000$50,000
18.6%
30.9%
50.4%

$50,000$70,000
20.8%
42.0%
37.2%

> $70,000

N Size

28.6%
42.6%
28.8%

(300)
(503)
(665)

Also of note is the fact that, even after controlling for the race variable, over half
of respondents responded with “More” all the way up to the $30,000-$50,000 family
income range (admittedly, by less half a percent in that category). This suggests that
despite Mississippi’s status as a red state and the well-known fact that the Republican
Party relies more heavily upon whites for its voter base than does the Democratic Party,
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less wealthy Caucasians may still be disinclined to vote against their own financial wellbeing. If Republicans were to hold control of the state, one would expect that they garner
a majority of the white vote since nearly all of the black vote goes to the Democrats. Yet,
these results suggest that Republicans should not be getting the majority of votes from
less affluent Caucasians; indeed, the total N count for “More” responses is only slightly
less than the combined count of “Less” and “Same” responses, and larger than either one
individually. One would logically expect that a person who favors increased state
spending on poverty-assistance programs would not vote Republican as this is in
opposition to fundamental values of the Republican Party currently. Therefore, one of
two things may be true: Either these less affluent Caucasians are voting Republican
despite their poverty-spending attitudes, or they simply do not vote in sufficient numbers
to make their influence felt in political outcomes. This is a possible avenue for future
research regarding voter behavior in Mississippi.
Overall, the data provide clear evidence of a relationship between the two
variables in the direction predicted, with chi-square significance values below .001 and
substantial gamma values in the predicted direction. Therefore, Hypothesis 6 is accepted.
Hypothesis 7 states that those who identify as more Democratic are more likely to
believe that the government should spend the same amount or more on poverty assistance
programs compared to those who identify as more Republican. As expected, party
identification shows a very strong trend of more to less support for poverty spending as
one moves from more Democratic to more Republican with the highest gamma values
out of any of the tables save only Table 2. Notably, the gamma value for Table 12 is
significantly higher than that for Table 13, suggesting that party identification might play
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an even stronger role among African-Americans in predicting poverty-spending values
than it does among Caucasians. Another important feature of the tables is the fact that
Republicans seem much more divided on the issue than Democrats. While “Strong
Democrats,” those most likely to be strong partisans and/or political elites,
overwhelmingly responded with “More,” “Strong Republicans” did not provide any cell
percentages over fifty percent. A possible remedy would be to combine the “Less” and
“Same” categories, as the combined “Strong Republican” responses in both of those
combined are similar to the percentage of “Strong Democrats” responding with “More.”
Hence, Republicans are about as likely to prefer spending the same or less on povertyassistance spending programs as Democrats are to prefer spending more; this paints a
picture more consistent with the two parties’ opposing ideologies. Regardless, it is clear
that a strong relationship exists in the predicted direction given the relatively large
gamma values and consistently small chi-square significance values. Hypothesis 7 is
accepted.
Table 12 Party ID and Poverty Spending Preferences
Poverty
Party
Spending Identification
Strong
Preference
Democrat
Less
3.1%
Same
11.0%
More
85.9%
-.542
Gamma
< .001
X2

Weak
Democrat
5.0%
21.0%
73.9%

Independent
9.1%
20.9%
70.1%
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Weak
Republican
23.2%
38.3%
38.5%

Strong
Republican
25.1%
42.4%
32.4%

N Size
(376)
(758)
(1604)

Table 13 Party ID and Poverty Spending Preferences-White Respondents
Poverty
Party
Spending Identification
Strong
Preference
Democrat
Less
4.8%
Same
19.2%
More
76.0%
-.395
Gamma
< .001
X2

Weak
Democrat
9.4%
26.1%
64.5%

Independent
11.6%
20.9%
67.4%
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Weak
Republican
25.2%
39.4%
35.3%

Strong
Republican
26.8%
44.7%
28.5%

N Size
(346)
(607)
(760)

CHAPTER IV
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

“Let not him who is houseless pull down the house of another, but let him work
diligently and build one for himself, thus by example assuring that his own shall be safe
from violence when built.”—Abraham Lincoln, Mar. 21, 1864
Summary of Results
Hypothesis 1: Women are more likely than men to believe that the government
should spend the same amount or more on poverty assistance programs. This hypothesis
is rejected.
Hypothesis 2: Blacks are more likely than whites to believe that the government
should spend the same amount or more on poverty assistance programs. Hypothesis 2 is
accepted.
Hypothesis 3: Younger people are more likely than older people to believe that
the government should spend the same amount or more on poverty assistance programs.
The third hypothesis is accepted.
Hypothesis 4: Those who identify as less religious are more likely to believe that
the government should spend the same amount or more on poverty assistance programs
compared to those who identify as more religious. Hypothesis 4 is accepted for whites.
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Hypothesis 5: Those with a higher level of education are more likely to believe
that the government should spend the same amount or more on poverty assistance
programs compared to those with a lower level of education. This hypothesis was
rejected, as the opposite was found to be true.
Hypothesis 6: Those with a low income are more likely to believe that the
government should spend the same amount or more on poverty assistance programs
compared to those with a higher income. Hypothesis 6 was accepted.
Hypothesis 7: Those who identify as more Democratic are more likely to believe
that the government should spend the same amount or more on poverty assistance
programs compared to those who identify as more Republican. This hypothesis was
accepted.
Conclusions
The results above indicate the primary findings of this paper. These hypotheses
were analyzed within the scope of Mississippi Poll respondents from the ten years
spanning from 2004-2014. As such, the primary goal of this paper was to analyze the
influence of demographic factors on public opinion with regards to government poverty
spending within Mississippi specifically. While there is much literature about public
opinion on a national scale, there is relatively little which compares public opinion
composition in individual states and certainly there is little which analyzes the state of
Mississippi specifically. Furthermore, there is very little research or literature pertaining
to contemporary, twenty-first century public opinion specifically. Public opinion does
not shift easily or rapidly, but over the course of years it does shift; with the nation now
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being a decade and a half into the new millennium, it is entirely reasonable to believe that
previous conclusions drawn about public opinion before the year 2000 may no longer be
true, or may have shifted in the conditions under which they hold true. The data and
results contained in this paper are a step towards filling in that gap in the knowledge and
providing detailed research on contemporary public opinion in Mississippi—and
possibly, by extension, the Deep South in general, though further research would clearly
be needed in order to confirm that the findings of this paper can be extrapolated to other
states in the Deep South such as Alabama, Louisiana or Georgia.
This paper found that the two most important variables influencing public opinion
towards government poverty assistance spending continue to be race and political
affiliation/party identification. We know that these factors, at least, have not ceased to be
significant since the beginning of the twenty-first century. However, comparison to
previous data may reveal if there has been any shifts in one direction or another—if either
of these factors are more or less influential now than they were in previous decades. For
example, if seventy percent of those who identify as strong Democrats support more
government poverty spending in the last ten years, while the figure was eighty or ninety
percent for the decade preceding that, this reveals a trend towards more moderate views
on government poverty spending within Mississippi’s Democratic voters, even though
the same general conclusion can be drawn in both cases (namely, that identification as a
strong Democrat is an extremely powerful indicator of a person’s likely attitude towards
increases in government poverty spending).
Other variables found to hold undeniable significance include age, education and
income. While the literature about public opinion at large may suggest that there are
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conflicting forces in the interaction between education and income in determining
political attitudes, in the state of Mississippi specifically this is clearly not the case. Both
education and income were found to have a significant effect on poverty spending
attitudes in the direction consistent with the positive relationship between the education
and income variables themselves (i.e. the fact that a more highly educated person is also
likely to earn a higher income). In Mississippi specifically, therefore, there is no
contradiction between these two variables, at least with regards to poverty spending
attitudes (though as this paper demonstrates, poverty spending attitudes are strongly
correlated with party identification as well). Poorer and less educated individuals are
more likely to favor more government poverty assistance spending while more affluent
and highly educated individuals are more likely to favor the same amount of government
poverty spending as exists currently or less. Further research could be conducted to
determine possible causes for this outcome; for instance, it may be the case that
academics in Mississippi are not nearly as likely to identify as liberal as are their
colleagues in the nation in general. It may also be the case that education and income are
not as strongly correlated in Mississippi as they are in the general population, or that the
correlation between education and income has simply become less significant in the last
decade. However, such questions are outside the scope of this paper. A clear trend can
also be seen in the age variable; as the age of the respondent increases, the propensity to
answer with a preference for more government poverty spending decreases. This is
consistent with the finding that, in general, the conservative voter base tends to be older
than the liberal voter base.
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The least significant variables examined in this paper were gender and religiosity.
Gender appeared to display no significant effect whatsoever on poverty spending
attitudes. While the data does indicate the existence of some relationship, there is a
substantial possibility that such a pattern emerged merely by random chance given that it
is only very slightly different from a completely random distribution. It seems safest to
conclude that gender should be disregarded as an indicator of poverty spending attitudes
in Mississippi. The religiosity variable, measured by frequency of church attendance,
was measurably more significant than the gender variable. However, its relationship with
the dependent variable remains markedly less clear than that of the other five independent
variables.
While these results do not paint a comprehensive picture of public opinion
towards welfare spending in the state, they still have important implications for policymakers who wish to remain in office. It is clear that those who support poverty spending
programs in the state tend to be younger, less educated, less affluent, and less white.
Meanwhile, those who oppose poverty spending tend to be older, more highly educated,
wealthier, and more white. Politicians must consider which of these two demographic
groups to appease in both their rhetoric and in their actual policy-making decisions.
Logically, legislators should seek to curry favor with the group of voters that has a higher
turnout rate between the two, as this will do more to bolster their odds of re-election.
Under a delegate model of representation, it could also be said that the legislators are
literally doing their job by matching their policy preferences to those of the voters who
turn out in the greatest numbers on election day.
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In Mississippi, this dynamic plays out quite clearly with the state’s dominant
Republican party seeking to please the group of voters who oppose poverty spending
programs by the government. Given the demographic characteristics laid out above, it is
not hard to imagine that the older, wealthier, more conservative voters who oppose
poverty spending also vote in higher numbers during state elections. The Republican
politicians in Mississippi have opposed expansion of Medicaid in the state under the
Affordable Care Act, an action which directly declines a huge amount of federal money
intended to assist those living in poverty. While this is certainly not the only example of
state Republicans matching their agenda with a position that is hostile to government
poverty spending, it is perhaps the largest and most significant such gesture in recent
years. It is likely not an accident that the state’s legislators have chosen this side; as
described above, they have acted in accordance with the strategy of appeasing the group
of voters that is most important to securing their positions in office. Hence, it is
important for politicians to pay attention to public opinion research.
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